This paper studies duopoly in which two-sided platforms compete in differentiated products in a two-sided market. Direct competition on both sides leads to results that depart from much of the current literature. Under some conditions the unique equilibrium in pure strategies can be computed. It features discounts on one side and muted differentiation as the cross-market externality intensifies competition. Less standard, that equilibrium fails to exist when the externality is too powerful (that side becomes too lucrative). A mixedstrategy equilibrium always exists and is characterized. These results are robust to variations in the extensive form. The model may find applications in the media, internet trading platforms, search engine competition, social media or even health insurance (HMO/PPO). 
Introduction
In many markets, firms must satisfy two constituencies: consumers on one side and advertisers on the other in the case of media, policyholders and service providers for HMOs and PPOs, search engine users and advertisers, or application developers and users of software platforms. This paper analyzes platform competition when these firms engage in vertical differentiation. The model herein departs from much of the current literature in that platforms compete directly on both sides. Doing so qualitatively alters equilibria the understanding of which is important in practice.
The game considered has three stages: quality setting on one side (B) then price setting on the same side, and price setting on the other side (A). The dominant platform on side B is the higher-quality one for A-side agents, so vertical differentiation arises endogenously on side A. The insights of this paper are robust to alterations of the extensive form, and so may be applied to several markets like newsprint, operating systems or video game consoles, and even healthcare and education (see Rochet, 2010 and .
The results also extend where prices are zero on one side, such as media broadcasting, many internet trading platforms, and search engine competition.
A unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists only when the A-side revenue is not too lucrative. Then the optimal quality level of the top firm is lower than in a well-established benchmark. In this equilibrium, B-side quality and A-side revenue become substitutes. We know differentiation is a means of extracting consumer surplus whose cost is surrendering market share to the competition. But here every B agent allows the platform to extract surplus from side A as well, and so is more valuable. Thus B agents receive a discount commensurate with the profits that can be extracted from side A; then a lesser quality is necessary to attract the marginal B consumer.
Beyond a well-defined threshold, the quality-adjusted price of the high-quality firm is so low that it preempts market B, and consequently side A as well. But then the excluded firm possesses a non-local deviation and can monopolize the market too. Equilibrium distributions of the mixed-strategy equilibrium are characterized. The market may be preempted ex post, which is a distinct feature of two-sided markets in practice; for example, there is a single eBay, a single Google and a single newspaper in any U.S. city (except for New York City).
In this model it owes not to a contraction of market B but rather to an expansion of the A market, which induces more aggressive competition for B-side consumers. Capturing these phenomena requires there to be competition on both sides, a claim that I now further clarify.
Competition with differentiation has been studied, among others, in two papers by Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001) (hereafter GLS) and Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) (now DGO). In both, platforms act as monopolists in the advertising market (A), by each becoming the sole conduit to their consumers (B). Irrespective of the exact construction, turning platforms into local monopolies (bottlenecks) substantively affects the equilibrium precisely because price competition on side A vanishes. In contrast, if the model is such that direct (price) competition is preserved on the A market, a pure-strategy equilibrium may not exist at all. If it does exist, even in an inherently symmetric environment such as Hotelling's, a pure-strategy equilibrium cannot be symmetric.
From a practical standpoint, restoring direct competition on both sides is important on three accounts. First, the mere observation of a market gives no a priori indication whether platforms should be modeled as bottlenecks. Second, casual observation of some two-sided markets makes it plain that not all outcomes are symmetric (even if the model is). The New York Times is sizeably larger than is closest competitor. According to this paper, this asymmetry necessarily follows in many setups when direct competition exists on both sides.
Third, the bottleneck assumption understates the full extent of the competition between firms. This is especially acute where prices are relevant on one side only. Search-engines, for example, do not charge their users (B) for their services.
In this paper direct competition is re-introduced in the form of a 'single-homing' assumption: both sides have unit demand. From Caillaud and Jullien (2003) we know that single-homing amplifies competition directly on the side that single-homes, and therefore indirectly on the other side.
1 So too here, where direct competition for A-side consumers 1 What is important for the characteristics of an equilibrium is whether there exists competition on both generates a premium to being the dominant platform on side B. When it is large enough, this "premium effect" induces payoffs that are not quasiconcave; it is this lack of quasiconcavity that leads to a breakdown of the pure-strategy equilibrium. None of this arises absent direct competition on the A side. Single-homing also finds empirical support in Kaiser and Wright (2006) in the context of German magazines, in Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) in Italian newspapers and in Jin and Rysman (2010) , who study sportscard conventions.
The works closest to this paper are GLS and DGO, which both study a media duopoly. This multiplicity owes to the extensive form: agents have to form expectations that are fulfilled in equilibrium. In the present model instead, subgame perfection leads to a unique equilibrium. In the context of health care, Bardey and Rochet (2010) allow insurance companies to compete for patients (through premia) and service providers (through rebates).
Patients are heterogenous in their health risk and thus may value health services differently.
sides, not whether agents single-home or multi-home. Supplement available from the author. 2 In GLS, the revenue function at the advertising pricing stage of the game is independent of the competitor's price. In DGO the bargaining stage is independent across platforms.
This affects health plans' payments to physicians and hospitals, but there is no direct competition. The authors assert that little changes with direct competition on both sides. This suggestion should be weighed with some caution in light of our results. Reisinger (2012) allows for direct competition for homogenous advertisers, while differentiated consumers do not pay for the platforms. Advertisers do not care for the relative size of a platform's (the better platform), but for the number of consumers, hence there is no premium effect.
The next Section introduces the model. Section 3 covers the characterization and some implications. Section 4 presents an extensive discussion in which robustness checks are performed. All proofs are sent to the Appendix, as well as some additional technical material.
Model
There are two platforms, identified with the subscripts 1 and 2, that market a good (for example, news) to a continuum of B-side consumers of mass 1. Simultaneously it also sells another commodity (such as advertising) on the A side. 
B agents' net utility function is expressed as
u(b, θ i , p B i ) = θ i b − p B i ; i = 1,
)
, θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ). These consumers buy at most one unit (say, one newspaper). When
})
. Hence they will purchase from provider 1 over provider 2 as long as β ≥β ≡
A agents may choose to purchase at most one unit at price p
, where e is a scaling parameter and a represents the marginal benefit of advertising. Aside agents are heterogenous in this parameter, which is uniformly distributed on [α, α] with mass 1. The more B agents any A agent can reach, the more they value this service, so demand D i represent the quality of platform i. The ranking of the platforms' market shares on the B side defines their relative quality on the other side. Given prices
. This decision rule generates the measure
. There is no externality from the A to the B side (see the discussion, Section 4). The one unit limit implies competition on the A-side. It can also be interpreted as a tight liquidity constraint.
There is no capacity constraint and zero marginal cost. 3 The first assumption rules out the trivial case in which the low-quality platform necessarily faces zero demand in the price subgames on both sides; it is also sufficient for market coverage.
Quality θ i is costly and is modeled as an investment with cost kθ 2 i , where we impose
to obtain an interior solution in the benchmark problem.
Game: Platforms first choose a quality level simultaneously. Given observed qualities, they each set prices to B consumers, who make purchasing decisions. With D observed, they set prices to A agents in a third stage. This extensive form captures some real-life situations. 4 An alternative timing is discussed in Section 4; the results are robust to it. The equilibrium concept is Nash subgame-perfect. The three-stage game is denoted Γ. For any platform i = 1, 2, the objective function reads
3 A capacity constraint is either trivially exogenous, or endogenous as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , which may induce a quantity-setting game instead of the price game. 4 For example, in the case of media, B-prices (cover prices or subscription rates) are more difficult to change than A-prices (advertising rates), and the media format even more so. Also, readership is often reported to advertisers, so known to them when they purchase.
Equilibrium analysis
We proceed in three steps, starting with the A side where the platforms' behavior is not directly affected by B-side quality choices.
A-market subgame
This stage replicates the result of the classical analysis of vertical differentiation. Let e∆D = e · (D 1 − D 2 ) denote the scaled difference in the platforms' quality. Then equilibrium payoffs take a simple form, for which the proof is standard and therefore omitted (see Tirole, 1988) .
There may be three pure strategy equilibria in the A
is a monopolist and its profits are
Π AM 1 = eD 1 · ( α 2 ) 2 . For D 1 = D 2 ,
the Bertrand outcome prevails and platforms have zero profits.
Following Lemma 1 the profit function (2.1) rewrites
where B-consumer demand takes the form
B-side price subgame
From Lemma 1 three distinct configurations may arise on the equilibrium path. In the first case platform 1 dominates the B market, in the second one both share the B market equally and in the last one it is dominated by firm 2. Hence the profit function (3.1) rewrites Figure 1 ), from which we can construct the true best replies -discontinuous at the pointsp 1 ,p 2 . The discontinuity set is not trivial: mixed strategies cannot restore the second candidate equilibrium -see Figure 1 . Indeed an outcome such that θ 1 > θ 2 and D 1 < D 2 entails playing a weakly dominated strategy for player 2. So the intuitive reasoning whereby the low-quality firm may find it profitable to behave very aggressively in order to access large advertising revenue does not hold true.
6
Last, a necessary and sufficient condition for existence is verified by construction. 
is linear in the A-side profits. Platforms internalize the full value of the B agents, which intensifies competition for their patronage. The quality spread ∆θ, fixed in the first stage, may be too narrow to sustain two firms. That is, the high-quality platform may be able to pre-empt the market with its quality choice, thank to the cross-market externality.
Equilibrium
In the first stage, platforms face the profit function (3.2), which they each maximise by choice of their quality variable θ i . That is, each of them solves
6 That is, playing θ i < θ 2 but offering a very low price p
Figure 2: Profit functions for different values of the A-side profits
The constraint is a natural restriction guaranteeing that the endogenous thresholdβ remain within the exogenous bounds [β, β]. 7 On the equilibrium path it can be rearranged as a pair of inequalities: ∆θ
Only the second one is constraining.
These profit functions are not necessarily well-behaved. Section 6.1 of the Appendix studies Π 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) in the details necessary to support our results.
Pure-strategy equilibrium
For e(A + A) small enough the function Π 1 (., .) remains increasing (and concave) on the
, where it admits a maximiser. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (the higher curve corresponds to the complementary case). To ensure this is the case we impose
8 This arises from the condition (
is defined in Section 6.1.
which ensures that whenθ 1 solves the first-order condition, ∆θ ≥ 
The term Comparative statics show that θ 1 is decreasing in e: the more attractive the A-side profit, the more powerful the cross-market effect and the more muted is the Differentiation Principle.
We can expand on the insights of Proposition 2, where we take S&S to be the benchmark.
Corollary 1 In any pure-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ, quality is lower than it would be absent the A-market externality.
Differentiation is known to soften price competition, but here the cross-market externality puts emphasis back on market share and forces the platforms to engage in more intense price competition for B consumers. Lower consumer prices relax the need to provide costly quality: the marginal B consumer demands a lesser product. This result resembles DGO's equilibrium, which they call 'minimal differentiation'. Here it owes to the increased value of each B-side consumer, which renders differentiation costlier.
Mixed strategies
When Assumption 3 is not satisfied, the necessary first-order condition (3.4) fails to hold entirely. As can be seen on Figure 2 , the high-quality firm would like to pick the pointθ(e),
where Π 1 (., .) reaches is maximum. At that point its rival is excluded (∆θ is too low). But this cannot be an equilibrium for firm 2 can "leap" over firm 1 and become the monopolist at a negligible incremental cost k(θ 1 + ε) 2 − kθ 2 1 . To appreciate the mechanics, the extent of the discount firm must offer, increases in the A-side profits. The high-quality platform can further increase its price dominance by lowering quality: its B price is p
. This goes on until the quality spread is so narrow that firm 2 faces preemption; the market tips.
In the Appendix (Section 6.3) we show that a mixed-strategy equilibrium always exists.
Let H i (θ i ) be the probability distribution over i's play and h i (.) the corresponding density, 
Proposition 3 The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ is characterized by the pair of distributions H
with
) and θ c defined by θ c = max
The notation θ i = θ j in the second integral of (3.5) reflects that forθ(e) ≤ θ i < θ j , firm i collects zero.
Condition (3.5) balances the expected benefit from adopting the distribution H i with its expected cost, when platform j plays the best response H * j . The platforms do not mix over all the pure actions that are available to them. To see why, recall thatθ(e) is such that when θ 1 =θ(e) and θ 2 = θ, platform 2 has no market share and 1's profit are the highest. Suppose firm 1 picks a higher action than firm 2 (θ 1 > θ 2 ); playing θ 1 =θ(e) dominates any other play belowθ(e). In response, playing anything but θ 2 = θ is dominated: θ secures 0 while any other play generates a loss. Even if platform 1 selects a quality beyond the preemption point (θ 1 >θ(e)) firm 2's profits are still maximized by playing θ because they decrease in θ 2 . That is, the range
) is dominated and no mass should be assigned on it; but θ remains a best response to any quality θ 1 ≥θ(e), so there must be an atom at that point.
Last, platform 1 must assign some probability mass on the range
otherwise it is necessarily preempted by 2's non-local deviation.
These equilibrium distributions do not rule out an outcome such that ∆θ is too small to sustain two firms. However they guarantee that it does not happen with probability one.
To do so, platforms must (i) randomize and (ii) in doing so, try to sufficiently differentiate.
The next result further speaks to this point.
Proposition 4 Suppose e >ē. When no platform plays at the lower bound θ, the market is
necessarily monopolized ex post. Otherwise both operate.
Recall Proposition 1; depending on the choice of θ 1 , θ 2 , one or two platforms may operate from the price subgame on. However the length of the interval [θ(e), θ c ] is not sufficient to accommodate two firms: 
Zero prices on one side
Many two-sided markets feature zero prices on at least one side. This may be an equilibrium outcome or an exogenous imposition (or both in the sense of binding constraint). Examples include broadcasting, the Yellow Pages or internet search engine usage.
Proposition 5 Fix
p B 1 = p B 2 = 0. A
pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. A mixedstrategy equilibrium exists and is characterised as in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 tells us we should expect pre-emption in these markets. The examples of Google (users do not pay) or eBay (buyers do not pay fees) lend credence to this claim.
These outcomes do not arise in a model without competition on both sides.
Discussion
This Discussion is offered largely without proof. These proofs do exist and are available from the author.
One-sided or two-sided externality
The model ignores any externality the side A exerts on B agents. Media consumers may dislike advertising; game developers seek more gamers to market to, and these likely enjoy games' diversity. 
which is more restrictive than the one of Proposition 1.
Bottlenecks and preemption
Suppose that A-side agents are able to place at most one ad on each platform, as in GLS.
Then they are a monopoly on side A with profits π 
Robustness check: simultaneous moves
The three-stage game suits some industries well (e.g. media), but not necessarily all. For example, Hagiu (2006) studies the problem of game console manufacturers, who must simultaneously commit to a price on each side of the platform. The analysis is robust to this change in timing, except for one small variation. 12 . Consider the platforms' problem at the price-setting stage given some θ 1 > θ 2 and expected
The first-order condition with respect to p A i , i = 1, 2 remain standard; from this p 
These are linear equations in B prices, as in the sequential move model. This readily suggests that little will change from this new timing. This linearity arises because A profits are still linear in ∆ D. The solution concept is Nash equilibrium, the best replies are discontinuous and there is a unique equilibrium in prices, with a condition on ∆θ. That condition is also less restrictive than in the sequential-move game.
Things do change a little in the first stage. When the pure-strategy equilibrium can be sustained, both first-order conditions may bind, thus yielding interior solutions for both platforms. This is in contrast to the sequential game. But this behavior is non-monotonic:
for naught A-side profits platform 2 benefits from maximal differentiation, for low A profits it seeks less differentiation (smaller ∆θ), and for large enough A profits, maximal differentiation again. The reason is that under simultaneous moves, the discount offered by the dominant firm in the B market is smaller. So ∆D -the difference in their market share -is also 12 Here we discuss the results; the derivations can be found in a supplement available from the author smaller. As a consequence it is also less dominant in the A market and the condition on ∆θ is less tight. This creates an incentive for the low-quality firm to capture some market share in B by increasing quality. In the sequential game, the discounts are such that platform 2 never has such an incentive.
This difference in discounts owes to the timing. By way of (imperfect) analogy, one can consider the difference between a Cournot and a Stackelberg game. In the latter, the dominant firm commits to a strategy and the follower takes it as given. By the time they move in the A market, platforms are committed to a strategy in the B market. This generates incentives for platforms to behave more aggressively in the B market in the fist place.
Conclusion
This paper has developed an analysis of differentiation in a duopoly of two-sided platforms, where competition prevails on both sides of the market. This yields markedly different results, as compared to those typically found in the literature. Direct competition on the A side puts a premium on being the better platform (here meaning covering a larger share) on the B side.
This exacerbates competition in market B, with consequences on the nature of equilibrium.
Whether a pure-strategy equilibrium exists depends on the relative attractiveness of A-side profits; that is, we can identify why it may break down. This paper thus complements prior works, in particular GLS and DGO who analyzed cases of bottleneck competition.
When a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, differentiation is hampered because too costly in terms of market share. The more attractive the A side, the narrower is differentiation. It may be insufficient to sustain two active platforms, at which point the equilibrium breaks down. Then platforms play in mixed strategies and one of them may be preempted ex post.
These results are robust to a change in timing; all carry over to quantity competition in the B market and the mixed strategy equilibrium remains valid under horizontal differentiation.
Hence they are not exclusive to the chosen extensive form and may find applications in a broad array of industries.
Our ability to compute an equilibrium rests on the simple structure chosen, and in particular on two important assumptions: single-homing and independence between A and B-side consumption decisions. Single-homing is not essential but it is convenient. What is essential is that platforms compete directly for consumers on both sides, which single-homing captures. Independence in consumption decisions is important; it implies that the A side only cares for the B-side market share, not its composition. For example, it asserts that the choice of media consumption is not a signal for good consumption. But we do know that media companies strive to segment their markets to suit advertisers. These characteristics are so far left out for future research.
Appendix
The Appendix contains some additional material as well the proofs of the propositions.
Analysis of the high-quality firm's profit function
With the reformulation of constraint (3.3), the objective function of platform 1 writes
where
A is a constant. From the first line of (6.1)
we can see why (3.3) is necessary: depending on C, the platform may seek a large or small ∆θ. The second line of (6.1) rules out the artificial case of firm 1 facing a demand larger than the whole market. 13 For platform 2, profits are converging to
from above for some fixed θ 2 . This sequence exists and always converges for Θ 1 ⊆ R is complete. As e < ∞ and A and A are necessarily bounded, C is finite so there is some n and some arbitrarily small δ such
Hence Π 1 is continuous for ∆θ =
When C becomes large enough, Π 1 (., .) is no longer well behaved.
Claim 2 There exists some
C f ≡ [ (2β−β) 2 27k − θ ] 2 ( (2β−β) 2 3 ) such that Π 1 (., .) admits a binding first-order condition for C ≤ C f only. When C > C f ,
its maximum is reached at the kink:
Proof: Seeking first-order conditions of Π 1 (., .) with respect to θ 1 yields
and C > C f ; , θ 1 ∈ BR 1 (θ 2 ) can never be true. That is, the two statements of the first line of (6.3) cannot be simultaneously satisfied: firm 1 would not play the first line of (6.1), but the second one. We rewrite:
Because Π 1 is monotonically increasing belowθ 1 and the SOC is monotonic beyondθ 1 , it is concave for C ≤ C f andθ 1 is a global maximiser. The binding first-order condition
) . When C > C f , the first-order condition (6.3) is everywhere negative, hence . Therefore,θ 1 such that ∆θ =
is the unique maximiser of Π 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) given some fixed θ 2 .
Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium
Take Proposition 1 as established.
Proposition 6 A mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ always exists.
This assertion holds trivially when Assumption 3 holds. The balance focuses on the case where it fails. It is not immediate that the game admits a mixed strategy equilibrium, for the payoff correspondences are not upper-hemicontinuous and their sum is not necessarily so either. See Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . We need some preliminaries to establish the 
, the set on which the payoffs are discontinuous. Further define the probability measure µ(θ 1 , θ 2 ) over the set
. It is immediate that Υ 0 has Lebesgue measure zero, so that Pr ((θ 1 , θ 2 ) ∈ Υ 0 ) = 0. Next we claim 
has Lebesgue measure zero. Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) directly applies and guarantees existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Therefore the pair θ 1 = θ 2 = θ may be part of an equilibrium of the overall game. Then Proposition 6 asserts that a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ exists, which can now be easily proven.
Proof:
We only need showing that the payoff functions Π i i = 1, 2 are lowerhemicontinuous in their own argument θ i . Without loss of generality, fix θ 1 > θ 2 . We know that Π 1 is continuous for any θ 1 > θ 2 (refer Section 6.1). From Claim 3 it is immediate that Π 2 is continuous for θ 1 > θ 2 . Last, for i = 1, 2
Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986) can be applied, whence an equilibrium in mixed strategies must exist. 
Proofs
, where the profit function is defined by (3.2) . Therefore, letting
While it is always possible to find some point where 'quasi-best responses' intersect (e.g.
such that both play as if D 1 < D 2 ), it by no means defines an equilibrium. Doing so assumes that in some sense platforms coordinate on a particular market configuration -for example,
We first need to pin down the firms' true best replies. 
Lemma 3 Let
) .
. This is the difference in profits generated by firm 1 when it chooses one 'quasi-best response' over the other. For p B 2 sufficiently low, g 1 > 0. This function is continuous and a.e differentiable. Using the definitions of equilibrium A-side profits,
,p B 2 ) dp B 2 < 0, and
platform 1 is indifferent between either best response p
). The same follows for platform 2, which definesp
For each firm, its action must be an element of the best reply correspondence and these correspondences must intersect. We define a condition that captures both these features.
From the 'quasi-best responses', an equilibrium candidate is a pair of prices such that
An equilibrium exists only if these intersections are non-empty. Together, the definitions of a best-response profile (relations (6.4) and (6.5)) and of an equilibrium candidate sum to
Condition 1 Eitherp
or both.
Consider an action profile p * B satisfying this condition; from Lemma 3 each p * B i is an element of i's best response. For it to be an equilibrium the reaction functions must intersect. This is exactly what Condition 1 requires. For example, the first pair of inequalities tells us that player 1's optimal action has to be low enough and simultaneously that of 2 must be high enough. When they hold, player 2's reaction correspondence is continuous until 1 reaches the maximizer p * B 1 , and similarly for firm 1. ) is a Nash equilibrium. By defini-
) ̸ = ∅, and by Lemma 3, either
, or both if two equilibria exist. For the first equality to hold, the first line of Condition 1 must hold, and for the second one, the second line of Condition 1 must be satisfied.
Condition 1 provides us with a pair of easy-to-verify conditions in terms of prices.
Lemma 5
Existence. An equilibrium in pure strategies of the B-side price subgame always exists.
Proof: First construct a candidate equilibrium as follows. Suppose that platforms maximise
, respectively. Solving for the first-order conditions laid out in Definition 1 yields
From equilibrium prices it is straightforward to compute consumer demand: 
− eA cannot exist, for these prices are not best response to each other. At the price-setting stage, the cost of quality is sunk, so for θ 1 > θ 2 there always exists some price p
such that consumers prefer purchasing from platform 1. Then when both firms are active Condition 1 holds as long as ∆θ
, take the lower bound and substitute into the second line of Condition 1: 
) always exists, the first line of Condition 1 always holds. It immediately follows from (6.4) and (6.5)
Finally, directly from Lemma 5, we can conclude the proof. In particular no alternative equilibrium can exist when ∆θ <
. Consider such a situation, then the prices p − eA cannot be best responses to each other.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We begin by characterising the first-stage actions 
Both platforms operate.
Proof:
The following simplifies the analysis and lets us focus on platform 1's problem. . Also, the payoffs depend not just on the ranking of the firms' decisions (θ 1 , θ 2 ), but on the 
